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1. General Data for the Analysis of Knowl-
edge 
An important methodological issue in the theory of knowl-
edge is the question which kinds of items can serve as 
data that a proposal for the analysis of knowledge should 
cover. The common items are instances of knowledge or 
of some epistemic quality such as justification. 
Yet recent discussion has become more theoretical in 
this methodological respect. General conditions have been 
defended that any adequate analysis of knowledge should 
fulfil. The most prominent instance is presumably the inter-
nalism/externalism distinction, internalism and externalism 
being highly general distinctions within accounts of justi-
fication or warrant (which latter are intended as parts of the 
analysis of knowledge). 
The avoidance of Gettier counterexamples may also be 
seen as a general datum for an adequate analysis of 
knowledge. For Gettier counterexamples are thought to 
constitute a class which share a common property such as 
concerning false warranted beliefs that are possibly acci-
dentally true or from which accidentally true beliefs can be 
inferred (cf. Gettier 1963, Merricks 1995, Howard-Snyder 
and Feit 2003). Since the avoidance of Gettier counterex-
amples is the issue the positive constraint on an adequate 
account of knowledge does not unambiguously follow, for 
there is no single constraint determined by not concerning 
false warranted beliefs that are possibly accidentally true 
or from which accidentally true beliefs can be inferred. This 
condition can be cashed out as warrant entailing truth or a 
warranted false belief being non-accidentally true if it were 
true (for details cf. Howard-Snyder and Feit 2003 and 
below).  
In the remaining I want to introduce three general data 
that an adequate analysis of knowledge should cover. It 
turns out that these data have implications for the theoreti-
cal concept of warrant which is defined as that which 
(eventually redundantly) together with truth constitutes 
knowledge (cf. Plantinga 1993a). Finally I will investigate 
existing accounts of warrant whether they comply with 
these implications or not. 
2. Non-Scepticism and the Consequence of 
Externalism 
The first datum is non-scepticism. The scepticism issue is 
of course not decided in favour of non-scepticism. But one 
can pragmatically argue that the analysis of an issue has 
to take the existence of the analysandum for granted. In 
our case the analysandum is knowledge and the existence 
of knowledge implies the possibility of knowledge which 
latter amounts to the denial of scepticism, scepticism being 
the position that knowledge is not possible. 
I now claim that by non-scepticism externalism regarding 
warrant is implied. For the internalist concept of warrant, 
commonly called epistemic justification, leads to scepti-
cism. 
Note first that the above argument does not make scep-
ticism and an internalist conception of justification prag-
matically incoherent. For the non-existence or the impossi-
bility of knowledge does not imply the non-existence or the 
impossibility of justification. 
The point of the sceptical implication of internalism is 
that an internalist conception of justification becomes 
indeterminate as to which belief amounts to being justified. 
In other words justification becomes wholly indiscriminative 
regarding beliefs. But it is the point of a sensible concep-
tion of justification that it allows a sufficiently conspicuous 
distinction between beliefs that are justified and beliefs that 
are not justified. For with an indiscriminative concept you 
will not be able to build a sensible conception of knowl-
edge unless the concept of justification plays no substan-
tive role in the analysis of knowledge. But then it has no 
function and thus no legitimate place in the analysis of 
knowledge. Yet internalists exactly claim that the concept 
of justification plays a vital role in the analysis of knowl-
edge. 
To see the indiscriminatoriness of the internalist concept 
of justification I remind that the core notion of the other-
wise very contentious concept of the internal encom-
passes some causal and spatial restriction to the respon-
siveness of a subject’s cognitive functions. Thus if you put 
yourself into a black soundproof box your cognitive facul-
ties will react to almost nothing what is going on outside of 
your black soundproof box (below a certain threshold of 
course). Hence the spatial and causal constraints to the 
internal are rather close to the spatial surface of the sub-
ject if not underneath it. The indiscriminatoriness of the 
internalist concept of justification then follows by brain in 
the vat and analogous scenarios. Such scenarios reveal 
that what is internally determined may be wholly inde-
pendent from what is actually the case. This is compatible 
with there being an actual distinction within our beliefs as 
to their justification, say by means of actual justificatory 
procedures guided by internal cognitive faculties. But the 
intended concept of justification should have some link 
with truth to be of use in the analysis of knowledge. For 
knowledge not only implies truth but non-accidental truth, 
as the Gettier problem most prominently reveals. And for 
justification to play a vital role in the analysis of knowledge 
it should contribute to the distinction between accidental 
and non-accidental truth. But such a contribution does the 
internalist concept of justification obviously not achieve as 
the compatibility with brain in the vat scenarios and the like 
shows. For they reveal that justification is compatible with 
any truth or falsity whatsoever. 
3. The Lesson from the Gettier Problem 
A second datum consists in general conditions that a 
solution to the Gettier problem should fulfil. Recently sev-
eral epistemologists have argued that any solution to the 
Gettier problem is committed to an infallibilist account of 
warrant, that is to the position that warrant implies truth (cf. 
Sturgeon 1993, Zagzebski 1994, Merricks 1995, Bigelow 
1999). Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder and Neil Feit 
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(2003) however have aptly shown that the general condi-
tion on warrant derivable from the Gettier problem is rather 
that either warrant implies truth or that warranted false 
beliefs would be non-accidentally true if they were true. 
Since this consequence is a disjunction whose disjuncts 
are incompatible nothing definite can concluded from the 
Gettier problem alone. 
4. Fallibilism and its Consequences 
A third datum is fallibilism. Since at least on pragmatic 
reasons we endorse non-scepticism, the possibility of 
knowledge is taken for granted. The pragmatic rationale 
for non-scepticism yet entails even the existence of knowl-
edge. On the other hand we know that many knowledge 
claims have turned out to be false. And we may suppose 
that all of our knowledge claims can turn out to be false. 
Yet because of non-scepticism this cannot happen at one 
fell swoop. This position is commonly called fallibilism and 
can sensibly be taken as a datum that any analysis of 
knowledge should comply with. 
Now from fallibilism it can be concluded that any analy-
sis of knowledge has to allow for a constituent concept of 
the concept of warrant that does not imply truth. It has to 
be the concept of warrant since truth alone as that which 
by definition (eventually redundantly) together with warrant 
amounts to knowledge cannot account for fallibilism be-
cause the implication of truth amounts to infallibilism, the 
contradictory to fallibilism. Yet the concept of knowledge 
without truth is by definition the concept of warrant.  
Yet together with the result from the Gettier problem that 
warrant entails either truth or that if a warranted false belief 
were true it would be non-accidentally true, it follows that 
to cover fallibilism warrant cannot entail truth but has to 
have the property that if a warranted false belief were true 
it would be non-accidentally true. 
Further with the first result from non-scepticism of exter-
nalist warrant it follows that any genuinely externalist 
aspect of warrant is not truth. For by fallibilism there are 
warranted false beliefs. Thus warrant cannot be truth. 
Finally this property of warrant has also to be present in 
warranted true beliefs, that is in knowledge. 
We can summarise the results for warrant so far as fol-
lows: (i) Warrant contains an externalist aspect which is 
not truth. (ii) Warrant does not imply truth. It is possible 
that there are warranted false beliefs. (iii) If a warranted 
false belief were true, it would be non-accidentally true.  
5. Consequences for Substantive Accounts 
of Warrant 
What follows from this for a substantive account of war-
rant? It has been remarked (Merricks 1995, 841-842) that 
(perhaps sometimes even unbeknownst to the defender) 
many substantive externalist accounts of warrant imply 
truth such as defeater accounts (Lehrer, Pollock), tracking 
accounts (Nozick, Dretske, Luper-Foy) or reliabilist ac-
counts (Goldman). These accounts are thus discredited by 
the results here developed. 
What appears to be a most congenial account to the re-
sults obtained is proper functionalism as defended most 
prominently by Plantinga (1993b). The reason is that 
proper functionalism grounds its analysis of warrant in 
properly functioning cognitive faculties. And cognitive 
faculties can lead to false beliefs even if they function 
properly and in an appropriate environment (cf. Plantinga 
1993b: 17-20). This is just an empirical fact about cognitive 
faculties. In other words cognitive faculties are fallible. 
Thus proper functionalism respects fallibilist warrant. 
Further proper functionalism grounds the counterfactual 
that if a warranted false belief were true it would be non-
accidentally true. For if a warranted belief is false under 
proper-functionalism there is proper function of the respec-
tive cognitive faculties in an appropriate environment and 
the belief just happens to be false because of some acci-
dent. But if this belief were true it would be non-acciden-
tally true. For the non-accidentality of the true belief would 
obviously be founded in the fact that the respective belief 
did arise out of the properly functioning cognitive faculties 
and a world in which such a true belief would arise out of 
these properly functioning cognitive faculties is closer than 
any world in which such a true belief would arise in some 
other way. 
It has been objected (Greene and Balmert 1997, cf. 
Plantinga 1997) to proper functionalist accounts of warrant 
that their non-implication of truth is incompatible with the 
infallibilist result regarding warrant defended by Merricks 
and others such as Sturgeon (1993), Zagzebski (1994) or 
Bigelow (1999). The result from fallibilism obtained here 
shows this objection to be inconclusive. 
Epistemic virtue accounts of warrant are promising as 
well. For epistemic virtue accounts of warrant found war-
rant in epistemic virtues which, at least according to the 
most prominent accounts (cf. Sosa 1991 and Zagzebski 
1997), are also constituted by cognitive faculties as they 
are empirically known and to which the notion of proper 
function in proper functionalism refers. Internalist accounts 
of warrant obviously fail. 
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